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Abstract 
This report provides a review and analysis of issues affecting the design of a lessons 
learned system for defense acquisition professionals. It draws both upon studies of 
existing lessons learned systems and upon the literature of organizational learning and 
knowledge management. While the discussion focuses on the enterprise of defense 
acquisition, the report's conclusions may be extended to lessons learned and knowledge 
management systems in other areas as well. The exploration of these issues suggests that 
attention to social processes within organizations is as important, if not more so, as the 
development of information technology processes in the success of a lessons learned 
system. The conclusions provide a resource for decision makers in considering and 




This report provides a review and analysis of issues affecting the design of a 
lessons learned system for defense acquisition professionals. It draws both upon studies 
of existing lessons learned systems and upon the literature of organizational learning and 
know ledge management. Its conclusions provide a resource for decision makers in 
considering and determining appropriate requirements for and resources to support an 
acquisition lessons learned system. While the discussion focuses on the enterprise of 
defense acquisition, the report's conclusions may be extended to lessons learned and 
knowledge management systems in other areas as well. 
The report begins with an overview of organizational learning concepts to 
establish the intended benefits of lessons learned systems. It then discusses operation and 
characteristics of existing lessons learned systems, as well as some issues in their use. 
The report then turns to address in some detail significant issues relating to how 
organizations learn and how they transfer knowledge among members and subunits. The 
exploration of these issues suggests that attention to social processes within organizations 
is as important, if not more so, as the development of information technology processes 
in the success of a lessons learned system. 
II. Background 
a. Project History 
During a meeting at the Naval Postgraduate School in early 1998, representatives 
of the Anny Acquisition Career Management Office, the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Department of Systems Management, and TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey 
(TRAC-Monterey) discussed the idea of developing a lessons learned capability for the 
acquisition community. On 1 May 1998, NPS Assistant Professor K. Snider and Colonel 
M. McGinnis, then Director ofTRAC-Monterey, presented a concept briefing on 
"Acquisition Lessons Learned" to Mr. Keith Charles (then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Anny for Plans, Programs, and Policy) and members of his staff. Mr. Charles 
expressed support for the concepts presented and requested further definition of tasks and 
resources necessary to develop this capability. Prof. Snider subsequently submitted a 
project proposal reflecting a joint NPS/TRAC-Monterey effort to design and develop, 
under ACMO sponsorship, a virtual (i.e., internet-based) center for acquisition lessons 
learned during FY99. TRAC-Monterey received funding to begin work in November 
1998. Work on an operational prototype system continued through the end ofFYOO. 
b. Intended Project Benefits - Organizational Learning 
The phrase "lessons learned system" in this report refers to the activities, people, 
and products that support the recording, collection, and dissemination of lessons learned 
in organizations. These systems may focus on "negative" lessons of failures, deficiencies, 
and other problems to be avoided, or on "positive" lessons of innovative techniques and 
"best practices" to be emulated. Definitions of "lessons learned" vary. While the Anny 
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defines them as "validated knowledge and experience derived from observations and 
historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations" (U.S. Army, 1997, 
p. 1), in the Marine Corps they are "procedures developed to 'work around' shortfalls in 
doctrine, organization, equipment, training and education, and facilities and support" 
(U.S. Marine Corps, 1994). Most systems in current use are inter- or intranet-based. 
Though the idea of learning from experience is timeless, formal organizational 
systems for capturing and disseminating lessons are relatively new phenomena. Attention 
to such systems has grown in light of developments in knowledge management (Nonaka, 
1991; Davenport & Prusak, 1998), as well as through the popularization of organizational 
learning concepts such as the "learning organization" (Senge, 1990). This growth is 
especially evident in the private sector, where a firm's learning capabilities and 
knowledge are viewed as strategic resources that give it a competitive edge (Davenport, 
1997a; Zack, 1999a). Advances in information technology in areas such as intranets, data 
repositories, and expert systems hold out the promise of wider, more efficient distribution 
of lessons within an organization. 
Contemporary organizational learning concepts reflect the ideas of early twentieth 
century pragmatists such as John Dewey (1925), who believed that people learn 
principally from experience. Based on experienced consequences of past actions, 
individuals develop "habits of action," or implicit theories that guide future actions. The 
pragmatists saw human experience as continually evolving, and so they rejected the idea 
of immutable truths or fixed principles. Rather, they held that, since knowledge is 
obtained through a constant process of encountering and attempting to resolve 
problematical situations, it has a pluralistic and experimental quality. Learning occurs as 
habits of action are modified and adjusted to respond to new problems or in light of 
newly experienced consequences of actions. 
Lessons learned systems represent an attempt to extend this view of human 
learning to means by which an organization may "learn" from its past actions. Of course, 
the use of phrases such as "organizational learning" and "learning organization" raises 
issues ofreification and anthropomorphism (Lipshitz et al., 1996). Some writers address 
such issues by defining organizational learning in terms of members learning from each 
other, that is, when members share "theories of action" (Argyris and Schon, 1978) or 
"mental models" (Senge, 1990). Many see an organizational culture (Schein, 1985) that 
promotes such sharing through honest and open communication as a key determinant in 
the creation ofa learning organization (Cook and Yanow, 1993). 
Lipshitz et al. (1996) take a more structural approach by focusing on 
organizational mechanisms that facilitate, make explicit, or routinize such sharing. These 
are "institutionalized structural and procedural arrangements that allow organizations to 
systematically collect, analyze, store, disseminate, and use information that is relevant to 
the effectiveness of the organization" (293). Such mechanisms could include organization 
histories, project reports, after-action reviews (Busby, 1999) and more generally, lessons 
learned systems. These mechanisms are intended to allow an individual's learning to 
become recorded in an organization's documents, processes, and other "memory" media 
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in such a way that other members may learn from it. Lipshitz et al. thus see 
organizationalleaming occurring when such mechanisms are employed, and the learning 
organization as one that employs them. 
Knowledge management incorporates many organizationalleaming concepts. 
Because it is a relatively new field of study, researchers have not yet established rigorous 
conceptual boundaries between the two. One probably can safely say, however, that 
organizational learning research stresses organizational processes and thus has a strong 
"organization development" flavor, while knowledge management research emphasizes 
managerial processes associated with knowledge creation, elicitation, analysis, storage, 
and dissemination. 
Other organizationalleaming concepts include single-loop learning, which occurs 
when members take actions in response to perceived problems or opportunities and 
evaluate the effects of those actions. Double-loop learning is characterized by a double 
feedback loop that connects the detection of problems and opportunities not only to 
corrective actions, but also to an organization's implicit assumptions and underlying 
norms. Such learning often challenges the status quo, and it can lead to fundamental 
organizational transformations as new norms and assumptions arise. 
To summarize, organizational learning concepts explain the intended benefits of 
lessons learned systems--to contribute to improved effectiveness or to facilitate an 
organization's adaptation to a changing environment. These occur through the 
modification of an organization's "habits of action," which might be reflected in changes 
to informal and tacit routines of operation or in revisions to formal and explicit SOPs, 
policies, or regulations. 
III. Lessons Learned Systems 
a. Center for Army Lessons Learned 
From the outset, this project was guided by the presumption that acquisition 
leaders have desired to equip acquisition practitioners with a resource similar to that 
provided to Army war fighters by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort 
Leavenworth, KS. Established in 1985 for the purpose of collecting lessons learned 
during simulated combat training exercises (U.S. Army, 1997), CALL is the earliest and 
best-known lessons learned system. Over the years, its mission has expanded to 
encompass lessons from actual combat and other military operations (e.g., ruST CAUSE 
in 1989). CALL's methods include both active collection oflessons by dedicated expert 
observer teams as well as passive collection of lessons submitted from the field. CALL is 
staffed with resources necessary to accomplish a variety oflessons learned functions, 
including collection, analysis, processing, dissemination, archiving, and research. It 
publishes tailored lessons learned products in a wide variety of media, including 
newsletters, handbooks, bulletins, and the internet, including both secure and public on-
line databases. 
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b. System Characteristics 
Zack (1999a, 48-49) describes the general sequence of operation of a lessons 
learned system. First a lesson is generated, usually by the individual learning the lesson 
or by an observer. The lesson is then submitted to the lessons learned system for 
processing, the extent of which is discussed below. It is then made available to other 
members of the organization, whether through publication and dissemination, or by 
storing it for later retrieval. 
While lessons learned systems have the same general objective, they differ widely 
in aspects of design and operation. Table 1 adapts Aha's (2000) characterization, 
developed from an analysis of existing lessons learned systems, to group system 
characteristics into lesson, operational, and organizational factors. 
Lesson factors describe the "product" of the system, that is, whether it produces 
lessons only (pure) or includes other products such as best practices or information 
updates (hybrid). The other lesson factor describes the type(s) of processes addressed by 
the lesson or other product. Technical processes usually deal with scientific, engineering, 
or other highly technical matters. Administrative processes usually involve fairly routine 
procedures or decisions made by a single individual, for example, a purchasing specialist. 
Planning processes entail more complex and strategic matters involving multiple 
stakeholders. CALL, for example, focuses mainly on "tactics, techniques, and 
procedures" for operational forces rather than on "macro-issues" or strategic operations; 
hence its processes would be classified as "technical." 
Lesson: 
Content Pure Hybrid 
Process Type Technical Administrative Planning 
Operational: 
Access Open Closed 
Formality Formal Ad Hoc 
Locus Centralized Distributed 
Process Relation Embedded Standalone 
ACQuisition Active Passive 
Handling Rigorous Open 
Dissemination Active Passive 
Organizational: 
Intemretive High Medium Low 
Context 
~ Adaptable Rigid 
Table 1. Lessons Learned System Characteristics (adapted from Aha (2000)) 
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Operational factors describe how lessons learned system function. Access refers 
to the extent to which those outside an organization may use its system. Open systems 
may be accessible to the general public, while closed systems have security features that 
limit their use to members of the organization. Formal systems have established 
procedures and processes of operation, such as those described in CALL above. The U.S. 
Geological Survey has taken a more informal approach in generating lessons that are 
based on analysis and synthesis of the findings of more than 250 scientific studies of the 
environment. These assist local natural resource managers in policy and decision-making 
(U.S. Geological Survey, 1995). Another example of an informal system is the Navy 
Acquisition Reform Office's (ARO) "Change Through Ex-Change" Initiative. Every 
three months, ARO solicits acquisition organizations to provide two approaches, ideas, 
process innovations, or lessons learned. These are distributed via diskette and are posted 
on the ARO web site. At an annual conference hosted by ARO, participants discuss their 
ideas and are encouraged to embrace two new ideas by incorporating them into their own 
offices or programs (U.S. Navy, 1999). 
CALL is an example of a centralized lessons learned system that serves the Army 
worldwide from its offices at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Department of Energy 
(DoE) operates a distributed system with a networked infrastructure of systems and 
lessons learned "coordinators" at various sites and contractor facilities. Lessons learned 
systems are embedded if they operate in an integrated fashion during other organizational 
activities, as in the case of Army units conducting after-action reviews in the course of 
training exercises (Baird et ai., 1999). Embedded systems usually feature active 
acquisition and dissemination ("pull" and "push") of lessons, while standalone systems 
''wait'' for user input and retrieval oflessons. The U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned 
System (MCLLS) relies heavily on decentralized reporting (i.e., passive acquisition) from 
unit after-action reports of exercises and operations. 
Handling refers to the level of treatment a lessons learned system gives a lesson 
after it has been generated. Rigorous handling implies significant control through some 
review and approval process, while open handling implies little or no control of lessons. 
At bottom, handling involves decisions as to whether one individual's learning, as 
reflected in the lesson, should be shared with others. Questions that arise here may 
include: Does the information in the lesson need to be verified, substantiated, or 
validated? Is additional information or discussion necessary to make it understandable to 
others? Does it sufficiently describe context and circumstances so that other members of 
the organization can judge the lesson's relevance under differing conditions? Is it 
consistent with organizational goals and policies? For example, CALL includes in its 
process of lesson development a coordination step to solicit comments from agencies and 
commands that may be affected by or have interest in dissemination of a lesson. The 
MCLLS features a process of lessons learned reviews by various working groups and 
committees, which assign responsibilities for analysis, action, and disposition. DoE 
lessons learned coordinators, among their other duties, perform a validation function 
before a lesson is submitted for publication. 
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Two organizational factors may be considered when determining how handling 
should occur. Interpretive context (Zack, 1999a, 50) refers to the extent to which 
members of an organization share similar knowledge, backgrounds, and experiences. In 
an organization with a high interpretive context, most members are likely to understand 
the content and significance of lessons generated by other members. Lessons generated 
in an organization with a low interpretive context may need to include more detail in 
terms of description and explanation, and may need to be "translated" during handling for 
broader understanding. The other organizational factor to be considered is how rigid or 
adaptable an organization is in terms of changing its "habits of action" in response to 
lessons learned by its members. An organization may have a culture that inhibits its 
ability to change, or it may be constrained by laws, professional standards, or by other 
organizations. Such constraints indicate the potential need to review, validate, and 
perform coordination on lessons before they are disseminated to and shared with the rest 
of the organization. 
c. Lessons Learned System Issues 
Though the benefits oflessons learned systems, and more generally, knowledge 
management systems have been widely touted (Davenport, 1997 a; Zack, 1999b), success 
is not guaranteed. One of the most significant pitfalls, according to Davenport (1997b), is 
the "If you build it, they will come" fallacy. That is, merely implementing a lessons 
learned system doesn't ensure that members of an organization will use it, either to 
generate lessons or to seek out those learned by others. Reasons for such lack of use are 
usually attributable to issues of motivation or organizational culture. Individuals may 
simply not have time to generate lessons after a learning experience, or perhaps they feel 
unwilling to acknowledge that problems have occurred. Others who are facing new 
situations may be unwilling to seek out lessons learned by others if they feel their 
problem is unique and not amenable to solution by past methods. Such participation 
issues may be addressed through a "championing" ofthe system by the organization'S 
leaders or through rewards and incentives designed to institutionalize use of the system 
(Fulmer, 1999). 
The effectiveness of a lessons learned system might also be affected by the 
substance oflessons, particularly if handling is not rigorous. Individuals may generate 
lessons containing problematic information such as unsubstantiated opinions, 
controversial findings, or self-serving claims, to name but a few. They may be poorly 
written, perhaps with little background or context that would allow others to judge its 
wider application, or with too much detail that bores or confuses readers. Such problems 
point out the need for some degree of rigor in handling. 
Of course, too much rigor in handling may squelch participation. Processes of 
review, editing, validation, and approval may become so burdensome that organizational 
members may lose interest in SUbmitting lessons. This indicates the need for a lessons 
learned system to include some feedback mechanism so that those involved in handling 
can keep members apprised of the status of their submissions. 
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Finally, LLS require maintenance. For example, databases need to be reviewed 
for outdated content, and periodic upgrades may be needed to incorporate new 
technology. Of course, such maintenance requires resources, which means that LLS must 
"compete" with other organizational programs for scarce resources. The failure of leaders 
to provide adequate resources may be perceived as a lack of organizational commitment, 
leading to low participation levels. 
d. Summary 
The discussion above has illustrated a range of alternatives available to designers 
ofLLS. This range indicates the need to examine several different factors of an 
organization and its knowledge needs in order to arrive at a system design that fits the 
organization well. 
To this point this report has treated knowledge, as embodied in lessons learned, in an 
implicitly sterile, individualistic, and mechanistic way. That is, it has portrayed 
knowledge as a commodity that may be obtained or developed by an individual and 
subsequently transferred to others. Such treatment ignores, however, significant 
epistemological issues. For example, against the commodity view of knowledge is the 
idea of knowledge as socially constructed (Berger and Luckman, 1967), or put another 
way, as the product of interpersonal relationships. The constructivist perspective 
emphasizes social processes that lead to knowledge creation and sharing. Drawing this 
distinction has profound implications for the design of a lessons learned system. From the 
commodity perspective, one would probably design the system to emphasize the ease of 
lesson input and extraction by organization members, while from the constructivist view, 
one would design to enhance development of their interpersonal relationships. The 
authors see such issues as too important to ignore and turn now to explore them in detail. 
IV. Organizational Learning in Acquisition 
a. Framing the Problem 
The challenge of creating a system in which acquisition professionals can learn 
from one another raises a more general question that has been explored in the literature -
namely, the question of how organizations learn, and more specifically how subunits 
transfer knowledge. The literature of knowledge management suggests in fact that the 
transfer of horizontal knowledge in organizations, especially when the incentives for 
doing so are not clear, is the major challenge for postindustrial organizations. 
Defense acquisition presents particular challenges. It is a relatively new area of 
study with few conceptual foundations upon which to build. Acquisition is a highly 
complex enterprise that encompasses multiple contexts-those of politics, business, 
technology, and the military, to name a few-and mUltiple stakeholders with often 
competing interests (Fox, 1988; McNaugher 1989). It also has a highly interdisciplinary 
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character in that its practice requires integration of a broad range of technical and 
management skills, including contracting, system engineering, finance, and many others. 
Acquisition managers are knowledge specialists, in that they have unique 
experiences in solving specialized kinds of problems, overcoming distinct barriers, 
forming alliances, developing cooperative relationships, working on common problems. 
In a sense, they master a complex kind of knowledge in which they must improvise 
solutions to new kinds of challenges for which procedural knowledge offers limited 
guidance. In some ways, the challenges of coordinating the diverse groups and interests 
in order to accomplish successful acquisition is unprecedented and shows no signs of 
getting simpler. There are few existing models to serve as guides. 
Sometimes organizations seek to improve learning by focusing on outcomes 
without attending to the processes that led to these outcomes (Brown and Duguid, 2000). 
This is often reflected in efforts to improve organizational effectiveness, such as total 
quality initiatives and reengineering, which are outcome-based interventions. To improve 
the acquisition process, however, it is not enough to study and learn about outcomes. One 
must understand the inner workings of the process, the practices and the meanings they 
have for those involved. In order for a "lessons learned" project to be successful, it is 
important to learn about members' practices. As Brown and Duguid (1989) point out, 
"people regularly invent ways around difficulties, discontinuities and unexpected 
irregularities in the course of their daily work and learn about their work in the process." 
Local innovations seed new possibilities, new ways of framing things, and new horizons 
of actions. 
In studying actors' practices, it is important to acknowledge that there are tensions 
within practices and that these tensions are often about struggles over meaning. This 
tension shows up most clearly when there is some organizational pressure for uniform 
information over the practice-based struggle for locally coherent meaning. It is important 
to allow for a diversity of practices and meanings and not squelch these local experiments 
in hopes of a uniform outcome. This raises the question of how organizations manage the 
learning process. Although organizations are primarily hierarchical, the development, 
dissemination, and use of knowledge is horizontal; knowledge often resists efforts aimed 
at direct control and manipulation. What are needed are processes that encourage the flow 
and transfer of knowledge as well as an infrastructure within which the creation of 
knowledge can occur. 
hnproving the acquisition process involves acknowledging the unique kind of 
knowledge necessary to be successful at this task. The acquisition process is complex in 
that it is idiosyncratic (different parties improvise different solutions to unique 
challenges) and contextual (different projects and schedules pose different kinds of 
challenges). In addition, the acquisition process is becoming increasingly critical and 
sensitive in the sense that it involves essential missions for which failure cannot be 
tolerated. Some new systems and subsystems, such as space or information technology 
systems, have no precedent. Thus, it is unlikely that the acquisition process will improve 
by trying to routinize each of its components. Congressional efforts to dictate 
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management improvements have met with mixed results and perhaps have made the 
process more cumbersome. A successful "lessons learned" project must involve 
appreciating (and sharing) the actual practices of managers during each stage ofthe 
acquisition process. 
To address this issue, this section of the report searches literature to address a 
number of themes, including: the various kinds of knowledge, th~ conditions that support 
and inhibit the transfer of knowledge between organizational subunits, the various forms 
that represent different knowledge, the transfer of knowledge within virtual communities. 
This last theme addresses important questions at the heart of the success of a lessons 
learned project. It is important to look at the relationship between information technology 
and knowledge management. Many assume that knowledge management cannot be done 
without technology. However, there is an important corollary: building elegant 
information systems will not guarantee participation nor will it guarantee learning. These 
questions are important because there is a popular myth in management circles and in 
some organizational literature, that knowledge is a matter of sharing information or that 
knowledge is simply a matter of acquiring information about a problem. This ignores 
evidence that organizational productivity has not improved in spite of large investments 
in computer technology, what Brown and Duguid have called the "productivity paradox" 
(2000, p. 83). 
b. Knowledge Complexity and Interdependence 
With the advent of advanced information systems, many organizations have 
increased information distribution and access with the hopes that learning will increase. 
Traditional views of knowledge and learning equate knowledge with information, as 
something that can be codified and shared. The assumption here is that knowledge is 
absolute, abstract, and context-free. Indeed, most definitions of knowledge management 
define the core problem in terms of information, thus putting the solution in the hands of 
information technologists. The notion is that making information available stimulates 
search processes. However, there is another field of knowledge management emerging 
that contends in order to understand how "best practices" travel, requires looking not 
simply at information, but how knowledge emerges in practices among groups of 
practitioners. More recently, studies have begun to appreciate that much of what we take 
to be knowledge is ''know how" that is contextual and is something that people "do" in 
situ. These themes are reviewed below. 
Theorists of knowledge management have distinguished between different kinds 
of knowledge. The type of knowledge to be transferred influences what should be the 
best method of transfer. Consider the difference between learning how to do an algebra 
problem and learning to be a carpenter. One can be understood via the transmission of 
abstract concepts; learning to be a carpenter, however, involves purposeful activity and 
experimentation, a kind of learning that is beyond verbalization. Many (e.g., Nonaka, 
1991) have built on the work ofPolanyi (1966) to create a distinction and a continuum 
between explicit and tacit knowledge. Knowledge that is considered complex, difficult to 
verbalize, codify or document in writing is tacit knowledge; it can be acquired only 
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through experience. Tacit lmowledge is highly personal and deeply rooted in action. It 
also has an important cognitive dimension and consists of mental models, beliefs, and 
perspectives so ingrained that we take them for granted and cannot easily articulate them. 
Explicit lmowledge is that which can be codified, is acontextual and corresponds to 
traditional "banking concepts" ofleaming in which we assume lmowledge can be 
transferred from one party to another regardless of context. Not surprisingly, most studies 
agree that lmowledge that can be codified is easier to transfer than complex lmowledge. 
Hansen (1999) describes lmowledge dependency. Knowledge that is independent 
(for example, a stand alone, distinct software module) and does not rely on other 
lmowledge components is easier to transfer than lmowledge that is dependent on and 
must function in conjunction with other components. When lmowledge to be transferred 
is complex and interdependent, lmowledge transfer is difficult. 
Tyre and Hippel (1997) emphasize the situated nature of knowledge. They claim 
that knowledge is not absolute, but is dependent on context and setting. Actors no doubt 
draw upon codified, abstract theory in their local, informal routines, but they adapt them 
as they work on problems within particular circumstances. Looking at the "situated" 
nature of learning has led lmowledge management theorists to discern the complexity of 
lmowledge to be transferred and raises the issue oflmowledge representation. Often 
organizations fail to recognize the complexity oflmowledge by listing jobs in simple, 
canonical steps, perhaps in an effort to "downskill" positions. When managers and 
designers adopt this outlook, it inhibits their comprehension of the importance of non-
canonical practices. From this perspective, people look like they are performing jobs 
according to formal job descriptions. Actual on the job practice, however requires 
interpolations between abstract knowledge and practical, situated demands. 
Orr (1996) points out the dichotomy between managers' understanding of job 
requirements and actual practices: "Although the documentation becomes more 
prescriptive and ostensibly more simple, in actuality the task becomes more 
improvisational and more complex" (p. 42). This point is illustrated in his study of 
Xerox's training of service technician representatives. The trainers, in an effort to 
downskill the task of machine repair, attempted to document every imaginable 
breakdown in copiers, so that when technicians arrived to repair a machine, they simply 
looked it up in the manual and followed a pre-determined decision tree to perform a 
series oftests that dictate a repair procedure. Their premise was that a diagnostic 
sequence could be devised to respond to the machine's predictable problems. However, 
the study revealed that no amount of documentation could include enough contextual 
information necessary to understand every problem. Orr relays a story of a technical 
representative confronting a machine with error codes and malfunctions that were not 
congruent with the diagnostic blueprint. This machine's malfunction did not fit the kind 
of errors that were documented nor had anything like this problem been covered in his 
training. Both he and the technical specialist he called in to help were baffled. To simply 
give up the repair effort and replace the machine would have been a solution, but would 
have meant loss of face with the customer - an unacceptable solution. After exhausting 
the approaches suggested by the diagnostic, they attempted to make sense of this anomaly 
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by connecting it to previous experiences and stories they had heard from others' 
experience. After a 5-hour trouble shooting session of trials and errors, they fell upon a 
solution. 
Many jobs in organizations require this type of bricolage - fumbling around, 
experimenting, and patching together an understanding of problems from bits and pieces 
of experience, improvising with the materials at hand. Few problems provide their own 
definitive solutions. In Orr's account, the technicians go through constructing a coherent 
account of malfunction out of the incoherence of the data and documentation. They go 
through a long story-telling procedure, talking about the machine's erratic behavior, their 
memories of other technicians' stories, information from users, which they try to put 
together in a composite story. The process of forming the story actually becomes an 
integral part of the diagnosis. This process begins and ends with communal 
understandings that are not available on canonical documents; narration is an important in 
integrating the various facts of situation. 
This suggests that, in order for lmowledge to be transferred, there must be 
informal interaction between individuals and units. The organization cannot simply 
decree lmowledge transfer and expect it to occur. Informal communication must be 
encouraged through enabling systems that appreciate the situated context. Tyre and 
Hippel (1997), in studies of engineers, demonstrated that physical setting is an important 
part of the learning process. Engineers had to travel back to the lab or to the plant to 
discover the clues embedded in their context in order to notice the problems that others 
did not "see." Data gathering is, they claimed, a situated skill. The interpretation of a 
message depends on where the hearer is located; engineers are able to believe 
"impossible" sounding problems only when they arrive on the scene and discover the 
unexpected maintenance problems and how an anomalous event could actually occur. 
Codified, abstract lmowledge is seldom sufficient to solve actual problems in 
organizations (Tyre and Hippel, 1997). Members must engage in informal, unstructured 
processes of sense making (Weick, 1979) and storytelling (Orr, 1990; Brown and Duguid, 
1991). Collaborative inquiry in which ideas grow out of conversations among participants 
is more useful than classroom learning. Discussion, negotiation, and argument are core to 
the learning process. 
These studies have led Brown and Duguid (1991) to refer to organizations as 
communities of practices. To foster learning, they contend, organizations must see 
beyond conventional, canonical job descriptions and recognize the rich practices 
themselves. In the example of the technical representative above, the successful 
experience with the recalcitrant machine became part of the technicians' folklore, told and 
retold during coffee breaks. These stories form a community memory that others could 
draw upon when facing unfamiliar problems. 
What about someone who is simply informally listening to a discussion between 
two technicians, but is not himself engaged in a legitimized organizational activity? Lave 
and Wenger (1991) contend that understanding how to function as an insider is essential 
to organizational learning. This recognizes that learning is much more than receiving 
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abstract, acontextual, and disembodied knowledge. It is a matter of learning how to speak 
the language of the community of practitioners. Lave and Wenger adopted the tenn 
"legitimate peripheral participation" to describe the dynamics by which someone on the 
periphery of a community of practitioners can legitimately become socialized into values, 
nonns, beliefs, modes of sense making - all of which are central to the learning process. 
As members become increasingly socialized into practice they move from peripheral to 
"full" participation. To participate in a practice community means to have access to "a 
wide range of ongoing activity, old-timers, and other members of the community; and to 
infonnation, resources, and opportunities for participation" (pp. 100-101). Members learn 
new discourses and new ways oftalking. By telling different stories, they are 
constructing meaning about their past and shaping future practice; they are also 
constructing an identity for themselves and how they are situated within the community. 
Newcomers learn "to talk as a key to legitimate peripheral participation" (p. 109). 
Learning is thus more than a matter of the cognitive acquisition of infonnation. It also 
involves a shift in identity and modes of practice, learning a new way of talking, a new 
way of sense making, of shaping meaning of past actions and future possibilities; it 
involves changes in relationships with other members inside and outside the community. 
Weick and Roberts (1993), in their study of aircraft carrier operations, developed 
the notion of "collective mind" and addressed the issue of how a community of practice 
can create "heedful interrelating." The dynamics of collective mind involve three 
processes that make up an activity system: contributing, representing, and subordinating. 
Collective mind exists when individuals construct their activity (contribution), as they 
envision the activity system (representation), and interrelate actively within the system 
they envisage (subordination). They acknowledge the power of narrative to capture the 
rich complexity and nuances of workplace life. This is especially important for 
socializing newcomers. As new members hear the organization's story and myths, they 
begin to comprehend what heedful relating means in practice. 
c. Relationships Between Learners 
If infonnal networks are important, what kinds of relationships enhance learning? How 
much mutual trust and understanding is necessary between parties? Following Lucas and 
Ogilvie (1999), group heterogeneity is an important factor in the dissemination of 
knowledge. Homogenous groups usually have access to the same infonnation and 
therefore offer limited opportunities for learning. Potential for knowledge transfer is 
increased when members have different backgrounds and different experiences. Members 
can complement each other's understanding when they bring different experiences. 
However, there is a price for this richer learning potential: it is costly to maintain 
knowledge transfer among groups that do not have common experiences. Further, it 
offers the potential for more conflict. This is an important issue, especially if the 
organization is relying on virtual mode of transfer rather than face-to-face 
communication. 
According to social network theory, knowledge transfer works best when 
members have weak ties. Granovetter (1982) claims that distant and infrequent 
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relationships (weak ties) are efficient for knowledge sharing because they provide access 
to novel information by bridging disconnected groups. Strong ties, on the other hand, are 
likely to lead to redundant information because they are present in small groups where 
everyone knows what the others know. 
Hansen (1999) argues, however, that network theory is focused on the search for 
knowledge and access to new information, which overlooks the issue of complex 
knowledge transfer. Weak ties, he claims, speed up the processing of knowledge when it 
is not complex, but slow it down when knowledge is more complex. He cites the product 
innovation literature to demonstrate that close and frequent interaction between teams 
and subunits leads to project effectiveness because of timely integration of knowledge 
across boundaries. Members have opportunities for reciprocal interactions, to try out 
knowledge, and to seek assistance and feedback when the relationship is strongly tied. 
This raises the issue of temporary relationships, the kind that one is likely to experience 
in virtual interactions. Hansen claims that it takes time to tum weak ties into temporary 
strong ties. Relationships to relevant people in another subunit need to be cultivated, and 
"the source unit's rational for becoming extensively involved in the relationship must be 
established" (p. 89). 
Hansen documents the difficulty of transfer of tacit knowledge. With tacit, 
complex knowledge, weak ties do not have beneficial effects. "[T]ransferring noncodified 
and dependent knowledge is less difficult to the extent that the parties to the transfer 
understand each other" (p. 88). If members are strongly tied, they probably developed a 
heuristic for processing tacit knowledge. The advantage of weak ties, he claims, is that 
because members are not tightly linked, they are more likely to search for non-redundant 
knowledge and are more adaptive because they are less constrained by the organizational 
system of which they are a part. Strong ties might constrain action while weak ties tend 
not to threaten autonomy. The disadvantage of weak ties is that there are fewer 
interactions for transferring complex knowledge; also the knowledge source may be 
unavailable if problems or questions should arise. 
d. Adaptation of Information Technology Systems to Improve Knowledge 
Transfer: Two Case Studies 
This leads to an essential question regarding knowledge management systems: is 
it possible to create a community of practice when members' connections are virtual, 
when the mode of interaction is web-based rather than face to face? Many organizations 
in the past decade have adopted information systems in attempts to enable knowledge 
transfer. 
What are some of the dimensions of the challenge that need to be anticipated and 
managed? Virtual communities lack the synchronic feedback and reciprocal exchange 
characteristic of a discourse that creates and reflects a shared history. Transfer of tacit 
knowledge requires a great deal of face-to-face contact through meetings, 
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apprenticeships, and training sessions. If a company tries to use a weak link such as an 
intranet database to exchange complex, tacit knowledge, it will likely faiL Electronic 
connections are fast but don't allow interaction and interpretation. Trying to exchange 
explicit infonnation through a strong link is also unsuccessful- explicit infonnation 
requires the ability to search quickly in a lot of places. The exchange of explicit 
knowledge can be completed through electronic means; where knowledge is explicit, 
weak links will do. E-mail is ideal, but strong links, such as meetings, are not efficient. 
The implications are great for productivity. Where units were exchanging explicit 
knowledge, those with weak links (e-mail) completed their projects 25 percent faster than 
those with strong links. Where tacit knowledge was exchanged, however, units with weak 
links were at a disadvantage; they took 20 percent longer to complete projects than did 
units with strong links (Hansen, 1999). 
There are few empirical studies that actually document the enablers and 
constraints in the adoption of infonnation systems for this purpose. Most of the literature 
is anecdotal and prescriptive. However, there are lessons to be learned in the areas of 
infonnation technology adoption when organizations attempt to share best practices 
virtually. Two contrasting studies illustrate some of the issues that arise when 
organizations attempt to implement "lessons learned" through the adoption of groupware 
systems. 
Orlikowski (1993) studied an accounting finn, Alpha Consulting, which adopted 
and used computerized documentary systems. Alpha ConSUlting invested in Lotus Notes, 
a documentary support system that has internet-like capacity with bulletin boards, posting 
mechanisms, discussion groups, and electronic mail for organizations. Alpha Consulting 
bought 10,000 copies of the program, believed that it was such a powerful technology 
that its usefulness would be evident and that if it were rolled out, people would use it. 
They believed that once people were given the opportunity to use it, they would learn it 
and find creative applications. 
The consultants were spread in different offices across North America and the 
Director of infonnation technology was concerned that these consultants were working 
on similar problems but not sharing their expertise with one another. They had hoped that 
Lotus notes would be a computerized info system that would store and share the solutions 
consultants had found to a variety of problems, a kind of "best practices" and "lessons 
learned" program. In the first test of Notes, infonnation technology staff and the tax 
consultants using Notes found it interesting in their projects. They used the program 
frequently and extensively. The senior line consultants were modest users while the more 
numerous junior line consultants were low users. They seemed uninterested in learning 
how to use the program, and gave up easily when faced with frustrations with Notes. 
Orlikowski discovered that the younger consultants, the ones targeted for these 
applications, had less incentive to learn to use the program. Their promotions, and 
ultimately their careers, are based upon billable hours that are tied to client work. There 
was no way they could justify billing clients for the considerable time it took them to 
learn this new system. Also, it was not clear what they would do with Notes after they 
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learned how to use it. Senior consultants who already hadjob security were more willing 
to invest the time to explore and experiment with Notes. 
Another group, the tax consultants who were located in the Washington, D.C. 
area, adopted the Notes program. The study suggests that they had significant incentive to 
show that they were visible and valuable within the finn, and using Notes was an 
opportunity to broadcast their visibility, to electronically publish their advice and make it 
available to many of the consultants around the finn, showing that the Washington office 
was not just overhead but an important part of the finn. Orlikowski's conclusion is that 
organizational incentive systems need to be taken into account when adopting 
infonnation systems. 
Davenport (I 997c) documents how another large consulting finn (Ernst and 
Young) successfully adopted a Notes program. They created a mini organization (the 
Center for Business Knowledge) that organized Ernst and Young's consultants' into 
specific areas. This organization was staffed with consultants from other offices, who 
were given 6-month assignments to playa special role as "knowledge networkers." By 
1997, they had developed 22 cross-office networks of consultants with expertise in 
certain industries and technology sectors. Each consultant network was assigned a half-
time person who codified the Notes databases, organized the insights from different 
projects, prompted line consultants to add their own insights, edited and pruned the 
project's discussion and document databases. For some units they developed "Power 
Packs" in Notes, an earmarked and filtered set of on line materials and templates. These 
knowledge networkers came to understand consultants' needs and topics very well. 
Because the knowledge networkers were on short-tenn assignments, they were expected 
to use this new expertise to advance their careers when they returned to their consulting 
positions. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that it is important to pay attention to the 
social context in which people use infonnation technology, as well as the particular 
incentive systems for using, organizing, and sharing infonnation in different work groups 
and work roles. The two different groups in Alpha Consulting and Ernst and Young had 
different incentives to share infonnation about their know-how, and their respective 
outcomes were different. But another dimension that is central in the second case is the 
presence of a group that facilitates the learning process. It is notable that this group came 
from the very consultant group for whom the program was designed. They were able to 
bring field expertise to bear, and were able to build ongoing relationships in the field to 
prompt users to contribute. They became familiar with the dilemmas and challenges in 
the field and were able to guide the users to various resources in the program. 
The above studies reflect a common assumption in much of the literature, that the 
problem with adoption of these infonnation technology systems is an issue of motivation. 
However, another study of knowledge transfer best practices offers a different conclusion 
and a different set of lessons. Szulanski (1996) studied the phenomena of "knowledge 
stickiness," the extent to which problematic situations are experienced during knowledge 
transfer. Most conventional wisdom proposes that stickiness of knowledge transfer is due 
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to motivational factors. Many cite barriers of jealousy, lack of incentives, lack of 
confidence, low priority, lack of buy-in, inclination to "reinvent the wheel," recipients' 
refusal to do exactly what they are told, resistance to change, lack of commitment, and 
turfprotection. He found that the primary obstacles to knowledge transfer of best 
practices are: 1) lack of absorptive capacity, which refers to the ability of the recipient to 
identify, value, and apply new knowledge; 2) causal ambiguity, or the uncertainty 
regarding cause-effect relationships on the part of the knowledge recipient; and 3) 
arduous relationship between the source and recipient, which is described by the degree 
to which the relationship serves as a conduit for knowledge and the degree of 
communication and intimacy in the relationship between the source and the recipient. 
This contradicts the conventional wisdom that blames motivational factors as primary 
barriers to the transfer of knowledge. The implications of these findings are profound: if 
absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity, and arduous relationships are the major 
impediments to knowledge transfer, perhaps it is profitable to devote efforts to develop 
the learning capacities of organizational units, to foster closer relationships between 
units, and to understand more systematically the practices and learning readiness of 
organizational units. 
v. Implications and Recommendations 
The body of literature reviewed in this report indicates that organizational 
characteristics and issues have at least as much, and perhaps more, importance than 
information technology issues in knowledge transfer. A key first step in the design of a 
lessons learned system, then, is to specify the organization for which the system will be 
designed. This is especially critical in regard to defense acquisition organizations, which 
vary in many respects. One could design an acquisition lessons learned system for the 
entire DoD, for any of the services, for a major command such as Army Material 
Command, for a subordinate command such as Aviation and Missile Command, or for a 
local organization, such as a lab, test range, or engineering center. One could also design 
a lessons learned system within any of these organizations for a particular specialty or 
acquisition career field, such as contracting, cost estimation, or program management. 
Clearly, learning will occur in different ways among members of these various 
organizations according to whether their relationships are strongly or weakly tied, the 
organizations' interpretive contexts, and many other factors. 
Some factors have received little or no attention by researchers of organizational 
learning and knowledge management. Much of the knowledge management literature 
relies on cases from private sector firms, and so unique aspects of public organizations 
may have been neglected. For example, private firms typically have clearer goals, such as 
market share and profitability, than public organizations. Indeed, the knowledge 
management systems for private firms are often "closed" and unavailable to outsiders so 
that the firms can protect their knowledge and learning to achieve a competitive edge. 
Public organizations, particularly large ones, have less clear-cut goals and perhaps even 
conflicting and competing goals among their constituent elements. Clearly, a level of 
competition exists within DoD among the services, among programs, and among depots, 
test centers, and smaller organizations (Kronenberg, 1990). It seems likely then that such 
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competition could adversely affect the nature and extent of participation in a lessons 
learned system that spanned several acquisition organizations. Conversely, competition 
might promote participation in a "closed" lessons learned system within an organization. 
Such effects could be manifested more widely in DoD's current policy drive to become 
more "business-like" in its operations. 
Table 2 shows how organizations might vary in some significant factors that 
affect acquisition lessons learned system design. Design may be most problematic for a 
DoD-wide system. Because most DoD members have weak ties (i.e., distant, infrequent, 
or nonexistent relationships) and low interpretive context (e.g., due to dissimilar 
backgrounds), a system targeted toward sharing of explicit and codified versions of 
lessons learned would seem most appropriate. However, possibilities of competition 
among DoD organizations may inhibit participation in such a system. Members of an 
acquisition specialty or career field in DoD share a higher interpretive context, which 
signals greater potential for lessons sharing. To the extent members ofthe same field 
share a professional loyalty to their field over loyalty to their organizations, some of the 
deleterious effects of competition may be mitigated. Members of the services and of 
major commands have weak ties, though interpretive context in these organizations is 
certainly higher than that of DoD. Organizational competition may yet exist at these 
levels, particularly for scarce fiscal resources. Sharing oftacit and complex lessons would 
be, as expected, most effective in subordinate commands and local organizations. 
Organization 
DoD Weak 
Career field across DoD Weak 










Service Weak Moderate Possibly mixed 
Major Command Weak Moderate Possibly mixed 
Subordinate Command Moderate Moderate Clear 
Local Organization Strong Hi Clear 
Table 2. Variations in Organizational Factors in Acquisition Lessons Learned System 
Design 
Such variation suggests the benefits of a contingency approach in lessons learned 
system design. Effective knowledge transfer between members of the acquisition 
community will require substantial investment of time and resources in determining what 
kind of knowledge is appropriate for different groups based on their relational history and 
context. Where members of an organization share strong ties, close proximity, and 
frequent interaction, complex and tacit knowledge will be easier to transfer. However, 
explicit knowledge may be redundant. If attempts are made to transfer explicit knowledge 
between strongly tied members, they might lose interest in the lessons learned system. 
Thus, leaders of smaller organizations should emphasize strong ties among members, a 
high interpretive context, and clear goals in order to maintain an environment that 
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facilitates sharing of complex and tacit lessons among members of a true ()ommunity of 
practice. 
Such communities of practice are probably not feasible in larger organizations 
where members are weakly tied and interpretive context is low. In such organizations, 
members are more likely to search for novel information in explicit and codified lessons. 
Thus, leaders of larger organizations should focus their efforts on eliminating barriers to 
and encouraging members' participation in systems that target such lessons. The 
Davenport study's findings maybe especially significant in this regard. Leaders of larger 
acquisition organizations should consider assigning temporary duty to "knowledge 
networkers," who would work to actively seek input and stories from members, to map 
out relevant needs, to encourage inquiry, and to make connections between relevant 
parties. These knowledge networkers would engage in ongoing action research, creating 
emergent categories of practitioners' experiences and fostering connections between 
potential collaborators. Holtshouse (1998) says that one area of priority is to research the 
flow betWeen knowledge seekers and knowledge providers in order to maximize the 
impact of knowledge. The system must continually learn the usage and communication 
patterns of both seekers and providers by looking at work practice profiles of individuals 
and communities. 
VI. Conclusion 
Acquisition professionals often find themselves creating novel solutions to 
unforeseen and unprecedented problems. Innovations that lead to successful acquisition 
outcomes are probably improvised. In many cases, therefore, the knowledge that would 
be most useful in enhancing learning within the acquisition community is the complex, 
tacit knowledge that resists codification and is difficult to verbalize. It is important in 
designing a lessons learned program to distinguish between the need for tacit, complex 
knowledge and explicit, codified knowledge. 
Transferring complex knowledge and sharing insights is more than a matter of 
passing on information. Rather, the transfer of complex knowledge in the acquisition 
community is a matter of sense making. It involves telling stories about the actual 
practices and concrete situations that acquisition professionals grapple with. Informal 
story telling best occurs through social collaboration and dialogue, where reciprocal 
exchanges can occur. This will be a challenge if the only medium for knowledge transfer 
is through a technology-driven data repository. All ofthe studies of knowledge transfer 
claim that technology is an enabling factor, but no panacea, that leadership must create an 
environment that supports and enhances the sharing of knowledge. 
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